From microchips to robots… Washington and Beijing are battling for the technologies of the future

From artificial intelligence and semiconductors to data centers, robots, and unmanned aerial vehicles, the arena of competition between Washington and Beijing is expanding at a striking pace. And what at first glance looks like a race between technology companies in fact conceals a broader struggle over supply chains, energy, data, manufacturing capacity, and even national security.

A few years ago, the question sounded simpler: who has the best artificial intelligence model? Today it has become far more complex. Who has the microchips these models run on? Who has the data centers capable of supporting them at scale? And who can guarantee the necessary power supply? And who has the data, software, and talent needed for the continued development of these technologies? In other words, who will be able to build the most independent and resilient technological system.

If oil was one of the most important sources of economic power in the 20th century, semiconductors may become one of the key factors of economic strength in the 21st century. Microchips are found in virtually everything: phones, cars, data centers, medical equipment, communications systems, aircraft, military systems, and robots. That is why semiconductors have turned from an ordinary industrial product into a strategic issue tied to national security.

Although the United States still holds significant advantages in AI research, cutting-edge models, advanced semiconductors, software, capital, and private investment, Washington is trying—through export restrictions on certain technologies and advanced chips—to curb China’s access to some of the newest computing technologies. In turn, Beijing is actively promoting the development of domestic alternatives and seeking to reduce dependence on American technologies. At the same time, Chinese companies have managed to narrow the gap in a number of AI applications and models despite U.S. restrictions on China’s access to certain advanced technologies. It is here that the essence of the new competition becomes clear. These existing restrictions, on the one hand, make it harder for China to access advanced technologies, but on the other hand, they стимулиate faster formation of a more independent technological ecosystem.

However, simply having an advanced chip is not enough for technological superiority—the reality is far more complex. A chip needs a software environment that enables it to operate efficiently. That is why Chinese companies are working to create alternative software platforms capable of replacing American solutions, seeking to reduce dependence on software infrastructure controlled by U.S. companies.

This means the confrontation is no longer reduced solely to a competition between an “American chip” and a “Chinese chip.” It is unfolding between two integrated technological ecosystems that include hardware, software, data, data centers, communications networks, developers, startups, and capital. At the same time, such an ecosystem requires constant, affordable, and reliable power supply, which is why electricity becomes another critically important factor in technological competition.

In addition, recent analytical assessments show that the race is no longer determined only by the speed of developing AI models—growing importance is attached to the ability to deploy these models and scale their use. That is why technological independence is becoming a long-term national project, rather than merely a program of an individual company.

Competition has also expanded and now encompasses robots, unmanned aerial vehicles, intelligent vehicles, and automated factories alongside microchips and artificial intelligence. China has a vast industrial base and extensive supply chains in many of these areas, while the United States is working to reorganize supply chains and reduce certain forms of external dependence. And here the importance of traditional industry is again evident. A country capable of producing microchips but unable to manufacture the devices, robots, and equipment in which they are used may still remain dependent on other suppliers. Therefore, technological superiority in the future will be determined not by possession of any single invention, but by the ability to build an integrated industrial system.

It is still too early to view U.S.–China relations as an all-out war. The economies of both countries remain interconnected to one degree or another, and some global challenges—notably the risks associated with artificial intelligence—require a certain level of dialogue and coordination. However, it is also difficult to ignore the fact that both sides are working to strengthen their technological capabilities and reduce dependence on each other. That is why some analysts describe the current situation as a kind of “competitive coexistence”: cooperation where common interests exist, and intense competition in the sphere of strategic technologies.

The consequences of this competition will not be limited to Washington and Beijing. Other countries will face difficult questions: which technological ecosystem to use? Where to buy microchips? How to ensure data security? Should they rely on American or Chinese technologies, or try to build their own technological capacity?

Countries such as South Korea, Japan, the European Union member states, Brazil, and Kenya may find themselves needing to strike a delicate balance between cooperation with the United States and maintaining economic ties with China.

Therefore, the question that will largely determine the shape of the global economy in the next decade may no longer be only about who has the best AI model. Much more important is something else: who will be able to build, operate, and scale the technological system as a whole? In this struggle, the decisive factor may be not possession of the most advanced technology itself, but the ability to turn technological achievements into sustainable industrial and economic potential.

Author:Candidate of Economic Sciences, Assistant at the Department of World Economy and World Finance, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation Lilia Ganem.