There is a limit, but you cannot find it by looking at the debt ratio. Japan’s gross public debt has exceeded 200% of GDP for years, yet Tokyo continues to borrow cheaply. Zambia, with a far lower debt level, defaulted in 2020. A rule that measures both countries by the same yardstick explains nothing.
The limit is determined above all by the difference between the interest rate a government pays and the growth rate of its economy. Olivier Blanchard built his 2019 presidential address to the American Economic Association around this difference. If nominal growth outpaces the interest rate, debt can decline relative to GDP even with a moderate budget deficit. If the reverse is true, debt grows until the government starts running a primary budget surplus. For much of the 2010s, wealthy countries were on the favorable side of this divide. Now they are moving off it. The IMF notes that in a growing number of economies, new borrowing is costing more than expected nominal growth, while G7 10-year bond yields rose by more than a percentage point from February to September, reaching their highest level in almost 20 years. In the United States, the Fund forecasts that interest payments will rise from about 2.8% of GDP before the pandemic to 5.7% by 2031—roughly as much as Washington spends on Social Security.
The currency matters just as much. A government that borrows in its own currency, mostly from its own savers, cannot be forced to default: its central bank can always print money. Inflation and voters’ patience are what constrain it. A government that borrows in dollars cannot rely on the printing press, and hits the wall much sooner. That is why the same global debt figure means a budget debate in Washington or Tokyo, but a shortage of dollars in Lusaka, Accra or Addis Ababa—usually in the form of a liquidity crisis.
Who holds the debt and when it comes due also shape the picture. More than $30 trillion is coming due across developed and emerging markets. Debt held by national pension funds that routinely refinance it behaves very differently from short-term securities held by foreign funds that can sell them within a week.
The composition of that $365 trillion says more than the total itself. Emerging-market debt grew by $6.5 trillion in the first half of 2026, reaching more than $110 trillion, with China alone adding $4.8 trillion. Both public debt and non-financial corporate debt hit new records, partly due to spending on AI and defense. Last year, advanced economies paid more than $3.3 trillion to service their internationally traded government bonds. That is more than the world is estimated to spend on AI, defense or clean energy.
For developing countries, the arithmetic has already changed. According to UNCTAD, from 2014 to 2024, interest payments on their public debt rose by 102%, while revenues increased by just 39%. Between 2018 and 2024, fiscal space shrank in 73% of them. In low-income countries, interest payments absorb more than 15% of tax revenue. Kenya will allocate more than half of its 2026/27 budget to debt repayment and servicing. Such governments hit the limit long before any threshold debated by wealthy countries—and pay for it in teachers and hospitals, not stock-market headlines.
The decisions wealthy countries make ripple beyond their borders. Higher U.S. Treasury yields raise the benchmark used to price every African Eurobond. As a result, an African finance minister’s room for maneuver depends in part on budget decisions made in Washington, Paris and Tokyo, where they have no say.
What comes next? Wealthy economies are unlikely to hit the wall. Instead, they face a slow squeeze: interest costs will crowd out investment and social programs, while occasional shocks in the bond market will force them to tighten budgets. The IMF is calling for credible medium-term consolidation plans; the OECD, for tighter spending controls and higher revenues. Some governments will quietly rely on moderate inflation and rules that channel funds from domestic banks and pension funds into government bonds, much as they did after 1945.
For poorer countries, institutions will matter more than growth rates. Debt restructuring needs to become faster and more predictable. The G20 Common Framework is slow, and Ethiopia’s case took years. Local-currency bond markets need to deepen so governments need fewer dollars in the first place. Multilateral lenders should provide more low-cost, long-term financing, which costs far less than default. UNCTAD estimates that if developing countries could borrow on the same terms as advanced economies, they would save more than 64 trillion Kenyan shillings a year, or about $500 billion.
The limit, then, depends on the borrower. An issuer of a reserve currency answers to inflation and voters. A country that borrows in a foreign currency answers to its creditors, who rarely give advance warning. The world will not run out of borrowing capacity all at once. It runs out first for those who have the least of it, and several countries have already reached that point.
Author: Assistant Professor in the Department of World Economy and International Finance at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Rafael Mulenga.